Introduction: The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine was a U.S. policy introduced on December 2, 1823, that stated that further efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention. The doctrine noted that the United States would neither interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European countries. The doctrine was issued at a time when nearly all Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal had achieved independence from the Spanish Empire (except for Bolivia, which became independent in 1825, Cuba, and Puerto Rico). The United States, working in agreement with Britain, wanted to maintain its new influence in the regions and to guarantee that no European power would move on these newly independent countries. 

President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress. It became a defining moment in the foreign policy of the United States and one of its longest-standing tenets. Later it would be invoked by many U.S. statesmen and several U.S. presidents, including Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. The intent and impact of the Monroe Doctrine persisted—with only minor variations—for almost two centuries. 

James Monroe

President James Monroe put forth the Monroe Doctrine, written by John Quincy Adams, in 1823.

Background

The Monroe Doctrine was inspired in large part by American government fears that European powers victorious in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) would revive monarchical forms of government. France had already agreed to restore the Spanish monarchy in exchange for Cuba. As the revolutionary Napoleonic Wars ended, Prussia, Austria, and Russia formed the Holy Alliance to defend monarchism. In particular, the Holy Alliance authorized military incursions to re-establish Bourbon rule over Spain and its colonies, which were establishing their independence. The United States, dedicated to the ideals of republicanism, wanted to uphold republican institutions in these newly independent states, as well as to seek treaties of commerce on a most-favored-nation basis.

Allowing Spain to reestablish control of its former colonies would have cut Great Britain from its profitable trade with the region. For that reason, Great Britain's foreign secretary, George Canning, proposed to the United States that they mutually declare and enforce a policy of separating the Americas (the "new world") from Europe (the "old world"). 

Although it is Monroe's most famous contribution to history, the doctrine was written by Adams, who designed it in cooperation with Britain. Monroe and Adams realized that American recognition alone would not protect the new countries against military intervention to restore Spain's power. In October 1823, Richard Rush, the American minister in London, advised that British Foreign Secretary George Canning was proposing that the United States and Britain jointly declare their opposition to European intervention. Britain also opposed the reconquest of Latin America and suggested that the United States join in proclaiming a "hands off" policy. After much discussion, Monroe took Adams's advice to not align with Britain. 

Analysis

On the surface, the objective of the Doctrine was to free the newly independent colonies of Latin America from European intervention, ensuring that the colonies in the Americas would not become a battleground for European powers. The doctrine put forward that the Americas and Europe were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence, being composed of entirely separate and independent nations. In reality, the Doctrine reflected a battle for economic and political power in the region in which the United States wanted the upper hand. The United States proclaimed that the Americas should be free from future European colonization and free from European interference in sovereign countries' affairs; however, this did not stop the United States from having its own drive to colonize further lands for itself.

Language of the Doctrine

The full Monroe Doctrine is long and couched in diplomatic language, but its essence is expressed in two key passages. The first is part of its introductory statement:

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

The second key passage, a fuller statement of the doctrine, is addressed to the "allied powers" of Europe (that is, the Holy Alliance). It clarifies that the United States remains neutral on existing European colonies in the Americas, but is opposed to "interpositions" that would create new colonies among the newly independent Spanish-American republics:

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

International Response

Because the United States lacked both a credible army and navy at the time, the doctrine was largely disregarded internationally. However, the Monroe Doctrine met with tacit British approval, and the Royal Navy mostly enforced it as part of the wider Pax Britannica, which maintained the neutrality of the seas. This was in line with the developing British policy of laissez-faire free trade: Fast-growing British industry was ever seeking outlets for its manufactured goods, and if the newly independent Latin American states were to become Spanish colonies once more, British access to these markets would be cut off by Spanish mercantilist policy.