OPERATION CARTWHEEL
Operation Cartwheel (1943–1944) was a major military strategy for the Allies in the Pacific theater of World War II. It aimed at militarily neutralizing the major Japanese base at Rabaul (New Guinea). The operation was directed by the Supreme Allied Commander in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA)—General Douglas MacArthur—whose forces advanced along the northeast coast of New Guinea and occupied nearby islands. Allied forces from the Pacific Ocean Areas command—under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz—advanced through the Solomon Islands toward Bougainville. The Allied forces involved were from Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the US and various Pacific Islands.
STRATEGY
Japanese forces had captured Rabaul, on New Britain, in the Territory of New Guinea, from Australian forces in February 1942 and turned it into their major forward base in the South Pacific, and the main obstacle in the two Allied theaters. MacArthur formulated a strategic outline, the Elkton Plan, to capture Rabaul from bases in Australia and New Guinea. Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a plan with similar elements but under Navy command. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, whose main goal was for the U.S. to concentrate its efforts against Nazi Germany in Europe and not against the Japanese in the Pacific, proposed a compromise plan in which the task would be divided into three stages, the first under Navy command and the second two under MacArthur's direction and the control of the Army. This strategic plan, which was never formally adopted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff but which was ultimately implemented, called for the capture of Tulagi (later Guadalcanal) and the Santa Cruz Islands (Operation Watchtower), the capture of the northeast coast of New Guinea and the central Solomons; and the reduction of Rabaul and related bases.
The protracted battle for Guadalcanal—followed by the unopposed seizure of the Russell Islands (Operation Cleanslate) on February 21, 1943—resulted in Japanese attempts to reinforce the area by sea. MacArthur's air forces countered in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 2-5, 1943). The disastrous losses suffered by the Japanese prompted Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to initiate I Go (Operation 'I'), a series of air attacks against Allied airfields and shipping at both Guadalcanal and New Guinea, which ultimately resulted in Yamamoto's death.
MacArthur had presented Elkton III, his revised plan for taking Rabaul before 1944, on 12 February 1943. It called for an attack by MacArthur against northeast New Guinea and western New Britain, and by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. (then in command of the South Pacific Area) against the central Solomons. This plan required seven more divisions than were already in the theater, raising objections from the British. The Joint Chiefs responded with a directive that approved the plan using forces already in the theater or en route to it, and delaying its implementation by 60 days. Elkton III then became Operation Cartwheel.
OPERATIONS
In New Guinea, a country without roads, large-scale transportation of men and materiel would have to be accomplished by aircraft or ships. The offensive began with the landing at Lae by the Australian 9th Division on September 4, 1943. The next day, MacArthur watched the landing at Nadzab by paratroops of the 503rd Parachute Infantry. His B-17 made the trip on three engines because one failed soon after leaving Port Moresby, but he insisted that it fly on to Nadzab. For this, he was awarded the Air Medal.
In early November, MacArthur's plan for a westward advance along the coast of New Guinea to the Philippines was incorporated into plans for the war against Japan. Three months later, airmen reported no signs of enemy activity in the Admiralty Islands and MacArthur ordered an amphibious landing there, commencing the Admiralty Islands campaign. It took six weeks of fierce fighting before the 1st Cavalry Division captured the islands.
MacArthur eventually caught the Japanese off balance and cut off Japanese forces in the Wewak area. Because the Japanese were not expecting an attack, the garrison was weak, and Allied casualties were correspondingly light. However, the terrain turned out to be less suitable for airbase development than first thought, forcing MacArthur to seek better locations further west. The campaign showed the effectiveness of a strategy which avoided major concentrations of enemy forces and instead aimed at severing the Japanese lines of supply and communication.
THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF
In July 1944, President Roosevelt summoned MacArthur to meet with him in Hawaii "to determine the phase of action against Japan." Nimitz and MacArthur agreed that the next step should be to advance on the southern and central Philippines. The Philippines Campaign included the Battle of Leyte Gulf - the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, possibly the largest naval battle in history. Following MacArthur's strategy, the battle was fought in waters of the Leyte Gulf, near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar and Luzon, from October 23rd to 26th, 1944, between combined American and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy. On October 20, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The battle consisted of four separate engagements between the opposing forces: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
MacArthur in New Guinea
Left to right: Mr Frank Forde (Australian Minister for the Army); General Douglas MacArthur; General Sir Thomas Blamey; Lieutenant General George C. Kenney; Lieutenant General Edmund Herring; Brigadier General Kenneth Walker.